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1.

Whether AMAX's property is "appurtenant- to a mine

within the meaning of U.C.A. S 59-5-3 (Supp. 1986) and therefore
properly assessed by the State Tax Commission, or whether AMAX's
plant is properly assessed by the Tooele County assessor under
U.C.A. S 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 1986).

2.

Whether AMAX's even though its property is centrally

assessed, is nonetheless entitled to a 20% reduction in the value
of its real property (which 20% reduction is made available to
county-assessed property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5) by
operation of the uniformity provisions of Article XIII sections 2
and 3 of the Utah Constitution
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooooOoooo
AMAX MAGNESIUM CORPORATION,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
v.
No. 88-0251
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent/Defendant.
-0000O0000-

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

STATMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this action
pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3(e)(ii) (1988), Utah Code Ann- S 59-1-602(3)
(1987), Utah Supreme Court Rule 14.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case
The Plaintiff/Petitioner, hereinafter AMAX, has
appealed the Formal Decision of the Tax Commission entered
against AMAX's personal property located in Tooele County, Utah

Section 59-1-602(3) was repealed, however, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-22(2) the statutes and rules governing the
Tax Commission's actions and review, and any judicial review that
were in effect on December 31, 1987 govern all agency
adjudicative proceedings. The Tax Commission's hearing took
place on June 3rd and June 4th of 1987. All statutes in this
case that are cited and all current codifications of the statutes
are listed in full in the Repondent's Addendum.

by the Utah Tax Commission.

Relief Sought On Appeal
The Plaintiff/Petitioner, AMAX, seeks on appeal that
its property be locally assessed under § 59-5-4.5 or in the
alternative that S 59-5-4.5 be held unconstitutional as applied
to the assessment of Petitioner's property.
Statement Of Facte
The tax year in question is 1986. The taxed property
in question is AMAX's property consisting of (a) a plant
comprised of personal property and improvements and land owned in
fee by AMAX (the "plantM) and (b) a series of evaporation ponds,
comprised of improvements and equipment (the ponds).
The plant is a magnesium manufacturing facility.

The

production of magnesium is accomplished by extracting magnesium
through various chemical and electrical processes from brine
containing magnesium chloride.

Brine is converted from salt

water through a seven year process of evaporation.

AMAX can

convert brine from salt water through a series of earthen dikes,
2
and ponds, impounding salt water from the Great Salt Lake.

The Plant is a large manufacturing facility, covering almost a
square mile of land, situated in the center of approximately
seven square mile of land owned in fee by AMAX. Through various
chemical and electrial processes, the Plant produces magnesium, a
metal not found in a natrual state, from concentrated brine
solutions. Brief for Petitioner/Plaintiff at 6, AMAX Corporation
v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 88-0251.

-2-

The ponds consist of a series of earthen dikes,
together with related improvements and equipment. According to
Mr. Frazer of AMAX, the closest pond to the plant is the holding
pond, located approximately 1/4 mile from the plant, the farthest
being at the end of the 15 mile brine line (TR 120).

The total
3
plant and pond area is approximately 70 square miles.
The land
on which the plant is located is owned by AMAX, the pond areas
are leased.

AMAX, through a seven-year process of evaporation

from the Ponds, obtains a metal product from the brine and,
therefore, is effectively mining brine from the Great Salt Lake
and then extracting the mineral magnesium from the salt brine.
The brine is harvested from the southernmost portion of the ponds
and transported to the plant.

Since a breach of earthen dikes in

1983, the concentrated brine harvested from the ponds has been
insufficient to supply the needs of the plant and AMAX has
purchased concentrated brine from another supplier. According to
Mr. Tom Frazer of AMAX, the brine is purchased from Kaiser in
Wendover, Utah (TR 89), near the Bonneville Salt Flats, and as he
pointed out, "it is the: same brineM (TR 142).

A reference to the

fact that the Great Salt Lake and the Great Salt Lake Desert are
geologically related.
Course Of Proceedings And Disposition In The Tax Commission
In 1986, AMAX's property was assessed by the Property
Tax Division of the Commission (hereinafter Division).

The

See Appendix 4 for maps from Bechtel Report (Ex. 24, p. 9) and
AMAX (Ex. 2A)

-3-

Division originally assessed the value of AMAX's property as of
January 1, 1986, to be $84,332,150.

Pursuant to an informal

hearing held on August 25, 1986, the Utah Tax Commission
(hereinafter Commission) reduced the assessed value of AMAX's
property to $78,312,895 by its Informal Decision dated December
1, 1986 (TR 536-538).

On January 2, 1987, AMAX petitioned the

Commission under Tax Commission Rule A12-01-l:4, for a plenary
formal hearing on the fair market value of AMAX's property.
Following the formal hearing of June 3rd and 4th, 1987, the
Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Final Decision, dated December 21, 1987 (Appendix 2).

The

Commission ordered that the Division adjust the tax to reflect
Pond maintenance costs as expenses, rather than capital
investments, but affirmed the balance of the Division's
assessment as established by the Informal Decision.
On January 21, 1988, AMAX filed a Petition for
Reconsideration.

The petition requested the Commission to

reconsider its position that the Plant was properly assessable by
the Commission as "appurtenant to" a mine within the language of
4
U.C.A. S 59-5-3.
The Commission denied AMAX's Petition for
Reconsideration on May 31, 1988. AMAX's now petitions this Court
to review the Commission's May 31, 1988, Decision and Order and
the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Final
Decision dated December 21, 1987.

(Appendix 1)

U.C.A. S 59-5-3, the statute at the time the issue arose, is
now codified at S 59-2-201.
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ARGUMENT

AMAX
5-4.5.

First, AMAX's property is "appurtenant*

withii

dne

meaning of the Utah Code and therefore, must be

assessed by the State Tax Commission.
(1986).

Since, AMAX's property is centrally assessed property
o take 80% of the value IF

its reasonable fair cash value for purposes of asse ssmeiiL

ih

Code Ann. $§ 59-5-3 and 59-5-4.5 (1986).
to AMAX's property and
the refusal to apply it in calculating the fair market value c I
AMAX's property does not violate Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and
Section
2(10) that intangble property be taxed in the manner and

» the

E x t€ i l: provided by the Legislature has not been violated because
the Tax Commission has taxed AMAX's propei< ", " • • " " "."
I as directed by the Legislature,
pjY.v i lit 1

" ,IJI

The guarantee of uniformity

i1 I I 11 III" I I , S

v i o l a t e d by t h e

^

Commission because the Legislature has determined that
is sustained by assessing centrally assessed property at a
ill U"t : j i i 'Pint, in ml

1 IL i

Il I" iii 1 I "if assessed proper t

The Tax

Commission, as mandated by the Legislature, has assessed AMAX's
Plant at "100% of its fair market value,

Utah Code Ann. SS 59-

5-1 (i98t
c

The full text of Article XIII, sections 2(10) and section 3
(1) of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated SS 59-1-1,
59-5-1 and 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 1986) are set forth in ADoendix 2 and
Appendix 3

ARGUMENT I
AMAX'S PROPERTY SHOULD BE CENTRALLY ASSESSED, NOT
COUNTY ASSESSED, BECAUSE ITS PROPERTY IS "APPURTENANT" TO
THE MINE WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-3.
The conclusion drawn by the Commission that AMAX's property
is "appurtenant" to the mine is obvious from a reading of the
statute and from an application of several fundamental rules of
statutory construction.

Section S 59-5-3, in pertinent part,

states that the Tax Commission shall assess the following:
[A]11 mines and mining claims and valuable
deposits, including lands containing coal or
hydrocarbons, non-metalliferous minerals
underlying land the surface of which is owned by
a person other than the owner of such minerals,
all machinery used in mining and all property or
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to
mines or mining claims and the value of any
surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining
claims or mining property for other than mining
purposes; must be assessed by the state tax
commission as hereinafter provided. • • • For
the purposes of taxation all mills, reduction
works, and smelters used exclusively for the
purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from a
mine or mining claim by the owner therof shall
be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or
mining claim through the same is not upon such
mine or mining claim.
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the words of
the statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole and not
piecemeal.

See Peay v. Board of Education of Provo City Schools,

377 P.2d 490 (1962).

A second rule of statutory construction is

"that the terms of a statute should be interpreted in accord with
usually accepted meanings." Utah County v, Orem Cityf 699 P.2d
707, 709 (Utah 1985); accord Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485
P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah 1971).

A third rule of statutory

construction is in construing legislative enactments, the

reviewer

assUnteS

that ea ch term i n the statute was used

advisedly, thus the statutory words are read literally, unless
::l is • " unreasonably confused or inoperable.
FIRST

RULE

Section 59-5-3 should b e read as a whole. See Peay

m

Section § 59-5-3 read as a whole would centrally
assess AMAX's property

roperly if- upi i 11 ^

property is "appurtenant* * the mine; or the property is used
i"">n, I in

1 i" II

reducing ore by AMAX from a mine,

even though it is not physically "appurtenan~

e

possibilities are whether (1) AMAX's plant : "upon"

)

the propei tj

J ap j: n: i I .< ^i u iii i I , I '
"I

should b e centrally assessed, and/or

e< =i I

u Lake and thereby

i the property is used by

the owner exclusively for the purpose of reducing ore from a
mine.

The C o m m i s s i o n

11 i:oiitM, i

in i

in IMI.1I in i i ni i i n

i ni

Findings"

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision that "the subject
p] ai I !::: :l s app • irtenant to the mine, i e , (iiifvif Sn it. Lake, ponds
from which the minerals were extracted. 11 AMAX Mac*
Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, No. 86
Commission's conclusion is
supported b y the analysis in the subsequent paragraphs.
SECOND RULE

Section 59-5-3's terms should b e interpreted with their
usual meaning. See Utah County, 699 P 2d at ?09 AMAX completely
ignores this rule b y suggesting that "appurtenant" can never mean
'--• i
f

ii in ! mi

i the context of S 59-5-3. See Petitioner's Brief

AMAX' s interpretation

I a 14*\ 1' I, e J 1 a t I
-7-

angauge

of S 59-5-3 is wrong.

Furthermore, many of AMAX's synonyms for

"appurtenant- mean "adjacent- or within the same proximity.
Black's Law Dictionary defines -appurtenant- as:
Belonging to; accessory or incident to; adjunctt
annexed to; answering to accessorium
in the
civil law. . . . A thing is deemed to be
incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by
right used with the land for its benefit, as in
the case of a way, or water-course, or of a
passage for light, air or heat from or across
the land of another.
Black's Law Dictionary 94 (5th ed. 1979).

The words "adjunct"

and -annexed to- which Black's accepts as synonymous with
-appurtenant" are likewise the same words ordinarily used to
define "adjacent."

Moreover, in this context, the word

-appurtenant" should be understood to mean "adjacent- or adjunct"
because the Great Salt Lake and the brines in the lake are state
property that cannot pass as -appurtenances" (as that term
ordinarily understood in real estate) with any personalty AMAXmay convey.
as property.

Neither are the brines as such subject to taxation
See Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific

Transportation Co., 495 P.2d 31 (1972), and Utah Code Ann. S 5913-77 (1953), as amended.

The Utah Legislature has made an

exception for the brines of the Great Salt Lake.

However, there

is no evidence to suggest that the legislature, by making that
exemption, sought to exempt mining property on the Great Salt
Lake from central assessment.

The case law is precisely to the

contrary. In Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 116 U. 314,
209 P.2d 739 (1949) the Utah Supreme Court declared:
It will be noted that Sec. 8-5-3, U.C.A. 1942
[the predecessor to Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-3] the
value of any surface use made of non-

8-

metalliferous mining claims or mining property
for other than mining purposes must be assessed
by the State Tax Commission. Hence, it would
seem that even if the surface were developed
into residential property so long as the
character of the subsurface were mineral, the
State Tax Commission and not the county assessor
must assess the surface value as well as the
mineral or mining value of the subsurface. It
is not necessary to decide which of the two
agencies would assess if the subsurface lost
character as mineral lands. All we need now
hold is that until there is proof that the land
has lost its character as mineral land or mining
property it is assessable by the State Tax
Commission.
J[IJ

, i in mi

"i mi I •

The meaning

the word •• appurtenant

Tooele County's closing arguements at the Formal Hearing, which
at €i • i ii; • ::: i: I::l: 1 i: epe a t:ii i ig here •:

_ ..

The statute does have two words. It has upon,
which I think is clear; a that is, on the
property itself, on the mine or the mining
claim. It goes on to state that It can be
either on or appurtenant.
Out at Rowley there is no way that the
manufacturing process can be on the mine or
mining claims, since the mine or mining claim is
the water
3o that's why the word appurtenant
was added
*-hat statute.
Over the evening I had an opportunity to turn
to "Words and Phrases," which is judicial
construction and definition of words. In "Words
and Phrases," it defines -~ it has several court
cases which define appurtenant, and it is much
broader than Mr. Buchi's initial opening
comments and statements
Let m e reac t j u s t a f e w 0 f those. Here is one
case which says, 'Appurtenant means belonging
to, accessory or incident to, adjuct, appended,
annexed to.' Here is another. 'The word
Appurtenant means attached to or belonging to.'
In the law, the term appurtenant usually means
something appertainting to another thing as
principal and passing as incident to such
principal.

A body of water, you bring water out, and you
process it right there.
TR 307.

Several important comments should be made about Mr.

Elton's closing statement.

First, the word "appurtenant" in S

59-5-3 should be read as meaning "adjacent toH or "adjunct to" in
this context because the property, in his view, cannot possibly
be "upon" the mine.
Great Salt Lake.

In this case, the "mine" is the water of the

Second, the word "adjunct" which Mr. Elton

cites as one accepted meaning of the word "appurtenant," means
"added or joined".

Obviously, "added or joined" can mean

sustantially the same thing as "adjacent".

The word "adjacent"

is defined
Black's Law Dictionary 38 (5th ed. 1979) as:
Lying near or close to; sometimes, contiguous;
neighboring. Adjacent implies that the two
objects are not widely separated, though they
may not actually touch, Harrison v. Guilford
County, 218 N.C. 718, 12 S.E.2d 269, while
adjoining imports that they are so joined or
united to each other that no third object
intervenes, (citation omitted). And "adjunct"
is defined as, "Something added to another, but
in a subordinate, auxiliary, or dependent
position. jCd. at 40. The words "adjunct" and
"annexed to" are synonymous with "appurtenant,"
therefore, in this context, the word
"appurtenant" should be understood to mean
"adjunct" or "adjacent."
Furthermore, the definition of "appurtenant" is best defined
by cases that have decided whether corporeal property is
•appurtenant" to, rather than cases that have determined if
incorporeal property is "appurtenant."

Incorporeal property and

corporeal property are defined as:
Such as affects the senses, and may be seen and
handled, as opposed to incorporeal property,

10-

which cannot be seen or handled, and exists only
in contemplation* Thus a house is corporeal,
but the annual rent payable for its occupation
is incorporeal. Corporeal property, if movable,
capable of manual transfer: if immovable,
possession of it may be delivered up. But
incorporeal property cannot be so transferred,
but some other means must be adopted for its
transfer, of which the most usual is an
instrument in writing.
110 (5th ed. 1979).

AMAX's property is

corporeal property because i1: affects the senbt
seen and handled.H

By defintion the property is not

" 1 1,'ui |IIJI »:ja l (in '• |ji i l I;

l

i

nrporeal property.

C a s e s AMAX c i t e s

as defining "appurtenant" are distinguishable because they ait
either defining incoroperal property as appurtenant to and/or
factually distinguit

present fact situation,

therefore, they cases are inapplicable.
3

See Petitioner's Brief at 22 nn.24-25. A M A X ' S i n c o r p D real
cases are: Roundy v. Coombs# 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983), "water
rights appurtenant to land." Petitioner's Brief at 22 n.24; Utah
State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), "The
rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the
land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute property
rights forming part of the owner's estate." jto. at 928; Aspen
Acres Ass'n v. Seven Assoc, Inc., 508 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1973), "In
the instant case, plaintiff owns no real property within the
tract and, therefore, has no right to interfere or control the
easements appurtenant to the realty therein." Id. at 308; Amos v.
Bennion, 456 P.2d 172 (Utah 1969), "mineral rights appurtenant to
land." Petitioner's Brief at 22 n.24(quoting Amos v. Bennion,
456 P.2d 172 (1969); Humpherys v. McKissock, 140 U.S. 304 (1891),
"the term includes easements and servitudes used and enjoyed with
the lands for whose benefit they were created." Petitioner's
Brief at 22, n.25; Denver v. Center for Performing Arts v.
Briqqs, 696 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1985), "appurtenances generally
refers to intangible rights, such as water rights or easements,
that necessarily must be conveyed for beneficial use of land."
Petitioner's Brief at 22, n.25; La Rue v. Green County Bank, 166
S.W.2d 1044 (Term. 1942), "appurtenance means that which belongs
to something else, or something belonging to another thing as
principal and passing as incident to it, as a right of way or
other easement to land." Petitioner's Brief at 22, n.25; Mt.
Carmel Fruit Co. v. Webster, 73 P 826 (CaJ , 1 903), "passage for
-11

AMAX cites Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 193 S.W.
1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) , as their primary source for their
interpretation of Happurtenant."

AMAX states:

Upon forecolosure, the purchaser at the trustee's
sale argued that a seedhouse — erected by the
cottonseed company on land some miles away from
the factory — was 'appurtenant' to the property
covered by the deed of trust. The court rejected
this assertion, reasoning that an 'appurtenance'
is '[a] thing belonging to another thing as
principal, and which passes as incident to the
principal thing.' 193 S.W. at 1095. The court
concluded that there was no such relationship
between the factory and a seedhouse built upon a
separate parcel of land. 'Certainly no one
reading the description as set forth in the deed
of trust upon which appellee's right is based
could reasonably conclude that a seedhouse a
number of miles in the country could be held to
be appurtenance to the lots . . . upon which the
oil mill was situated. Id.
Petitioner's Brief at 24. AMAX incorrectly applies Balcar to the
present fact situation by not stating why the seedhouse was not
appurtenant to the factory.

The reason the seedhouse was not

appurtenant to the factory was it was not essential to the
operations of the factory.

The Texas Court of Civil Appeals

states:
Note 'b.' same volume [Note 33b, Volume 4, Corpus Juris, p.
1467], says:
Cont. light, air or heat from or across the land of another."
Petitioner's Brief at 23, n.25; McClenaqn v. McEacherf 34 S.E.
627 (S.C. 1899), "the word 'appurtenant' necessarily involves the
idea that the owner of a dominant tenement has some legal right
in the premises appurtenant to it." Peitioner's Brief at 23,
n.25.
Those cases that are factually distinguishable are: In re
Eastern Boulevard in Borough of the Bronx, City of New Yorky 243
N.Y.S. 57 (App. Div. 1930) (land cannot pass as ••appurtenant" to
land exept in case of land under water); Kingsway R. & M. Corp.
v. Kingsway Repair Corp., 228 N.Y.S. 265 (App. Div. 1928)(land
never passes as appurtenance to land).
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'The true test as to whether a thing
Is an incident or appurtenance seems to
be the property of relation between the
principal and adjunct, which is to be
ascertained by considering whether they
agree in nature and quality so as to be
capable of union without incongruity, and
is actually and directly necessary to the
full enjoyment of the property.' [citing
Barrett v. Bell, 82 Mo, 110-114, 52 Am.
Rep. 361
£ t iye saicj in 1-^ present instance that the
seedhouse was absolutely essential and necessary
to the conducting of the oil mill ? We think
not. Certainly no one reading the description
as set forth in the deed of trust upon which
appellee's right is based could reasonably
conclude that a seedhouse a number of miles in
the country could be held to be an appurtenance
t C" the lot. a in Giddings, upon which the oi ] m I ,1 1
was situated.
Can

Id. at 1095.

Under Texas Court of Civil Appeal's analysis in

Baicax

roperty is essential to the operations of Hie mine

because the property, unlike

^e seedhouse,

operation of the process of the mine.
A H A X i II h i

n
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I he

Without the Plant and Pond

concentrate t o magnesium,

however, the oil mill could operate without the seedhouse in
Balcar.
THIRD RULE

The wording of S 59-5-3 should be read according to its
literal wording, unless ii would be unreasonably confused or
inoperable.

The Utah supreme Cou^

244 (Utah 1987), noted the manner
enactments.

L H o m e v. Home, 737 P.2d
*hich the courts construe

The Supreme Court stated:

In construing legislative enactments, we assume
that each term in the statute was used
advisedly. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 p.2d
445, 446 (Utah 1982). This Court therefore
interprets and applies the statute according to
• 1,1

its literal wording unless it is unreasonably
confused or inoperable.
Horne, 737 P.2d at 247; accord Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d
449, 451 (Utah 1967).
The -literal wording- of S 59-5-3 is not confusing or
inoperable.

The statute mandates the Tax Commission to tax AMAX,

(or any other entity), if one or more of the following are met.
First, if the property is "uponM the mine; second, if the
property is "appurtenant" to the mine; or third, if the property
is used exclusively for the purpose of reducing ore from a mine
by the owner, even though it is not physically "appurtenant" to
the mine.
In the present fact situation the issue of whether AMAX's
property, was "upon" the mine was not additional at the hearing
before the Tax Commission.

The Utah Code does not define the

word "upon," however, the wording of the statute reflects the
general definition of "upon," which means "on the surface: on
it."

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1296 (1985). As

this issue wasnot raised it will not be advocated.
Whether AMAX's property is "appurtenant" to has already been
discussed in previous paragraphs.
"adjacent" or "adjunct*"

"Appurtenant" should mean

See Brown v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 177

N.Y.S. 618, 621 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1919) (quoting Century Dictionary).
If, AMAX's property is not actually "appurtenant," then the
next question that needs to be asked is whether AMAX's property
is used exclusively for the purpose of reducing ores from a mine
or mining claim by AMAX and thereby deemed "appurtenant."
Section 59-5-3 in pertinent part provides:
-u.

For the purposes of/taxation all mills,
reduction works, and smelters used exclusively
for the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores
from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof
shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine
or mining claim though the same is not upon such
mine or mining claim.
This section of S 59-5-3 should be read literally because
not confusing or inoperable.

Determining whether statutory

language

start with I. he

presumption that the statute is valid, and the words and phrases
were chosen advisedly to express the legislative intent.

The

Utah Supreme Court in West Jordon v. Morrison, 656 I ' 2 1 < 1 15 (U t .
1982), states this presumption in resolving the interpretation

*

We must assume that each term in the statute was
used advisedly by the Legislature and that each
should be interpreted and applied according to
its usually accepted meaning. Where the
ordinary meaning of the terms result in an
application that is neither unreasonably
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant
contradiction to the express purpose of the
statute, it is not the duty of this Court to
assess the wisdom of the statutory scheme. See
e.g., Knox v. Thomas, 30 Utah 2d 15, 512 P.2d
664 (1973); Gord, supra.
accord H o m e , 7 3" ' i" "U ""in

" i ; see general i y

Music, Inc. v. Snyder et al, 469 U.S. 153 (1985).

MIKI 1 '

Section 59-

nclear as to be wholly beyond reason, inoperable,
contravention to some basic constitul: J, on i'ivjhl . Apply
english sentence diagraming to determine the correct
::I rit ,er pretatioi i of til E • -II list: sentence of S 59-5-3 it is clear
AMAX's property is deemed appurtenant
the sentence are "all mills
m

reduction works and smelters. H

i

reducing r it s m e l t i n g t h e o r e s
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from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof" is a
7
restrictive clause
that modifies the subjects of the sentence.
This sentence means that the subjects, (i.e., all mills,
reduction works, or smelters), used exclusively for the purpose
of reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by
the owner of the subjects are deemed to be appurtenant to a mine
or mining claim, even though it might not be upon a mine or
mining claim.

Therefore, AMAX's interpretation of the last
o

sentence of S 59-5-3 is incorrect.
The statute as applied to the present fact situation means
that AMAX property is "deemed to be appurtenant to a mine or
mining claim."

AMAX's property is used exclusively by AMAX for

the purpose of reducing or smelting the brine from a mine or
mining claim.

As pointed out by Mr. Frazer of AMAX, the brine

from Kaiser is the same brine (TR 142).

All the brine used comes

from the Great Salt Lake or the Great Salt Lake Desert.

Section

59-5-3 does not state that the mine or mining claim be owned by
AMAX, just that the mill be used exclusively for reducing ores
from a mine or mining claim.

Therefore, since AMAX's property,

(i.e., mill, etc.), is within the language of S 59-5-3 the
Commission is mandated to assess its property. See Bd. of Educ.
of Granite Sch. v. Salt Lake Cty., 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983).

"Restrictive clauses are the so-called "bound- modifiers. They
are absolutely essential to the meaning of the word or words they
modify, they cannot be omitted without the meaning of the
sentences being radically changed, and they are unpunctuated."
Webster's Secretrarial Handbook 287 (1983).
o

AMAX's interpretation of the last sentence is found on page 15
of the Petitioner's Brief filed with the Utah Supreme Court.
_* c__

ARGUMENT II
AMAX IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 20% REDUCTION
IN ITS TAXABLE VALUE.

The Tax Commission's position on Utah Code Ann. § 59-54.5 in the present fact situation is that AMAX's property is not
entitled to a 20% because AMAX's property does not fall within
the statutory language of S 59-5-4.5.
The Tax Commission is given the authority to tax
property by the Utah Constitution.

Section 11 of Article XIII

provides that the "State Tax Commission shall administer and
supervise the tax laws of the state.

It shall assess mines and

public utilities. . . . It shall have such other powers of
original assessment as the Legislature may provide."
art. XIII, S 11 (emphasis added).

Utah Const.

Pursuant to that authority the

Legislature, through § 59-5-3 (Supp. 1986), has directed the Tax
Commission to assess the following properties as they pertain to
the following fact situation:
[A]11 mines and mining claims • • . all
machinery used in mining and all property or
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to
mines or mining claims and the value of any
surface use made or nonmetalliferous mining
claims or mining property for other than
mining purposes; must be assessed by the
State Tax Commission as hereinafter provided
. . . . All taxable property not required by
the Constitution or by law to be assessed by
the State Tax Commission must be assessed by
the county assesor of the several counties in
which the same is situated. For the purpose
of taxation all mill, reduction works and
smelters used exclusively for the purpose of
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or
mining claim by the owner thereof shall be
deed to be appurtenant to mine or mining
claim through same is not upon such mine or
mining claim.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (Supp. 1986).

Pursuant to S 59-5-3

statute the Tax Commission has assessed the tangible property of
AMAX in this action.
Section 59-5-4.5 provides in pertinent part a different
standard for the county assessor to follow in assessing property;
When the county assessor uses the
comparable sales or cost appraisal method in
valuing taxable property for assessment
purposes, the assessor is required to
recognized that various fees, services,
closing costs, and other expanses related to
the transaction lessen the actual amount that
may be received in the transaction. The
county assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of
the value based on comparable sales or cost
appraisal of the property as its reasonable
fair cash value for pusposes of assessment.
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5(1) (1986).

No similar reduction is

allowed under S 59-5-3, the statute which directs the Tax
Commission to assess ••mines". Furthermore, § 59-5-1 requires the
Tax Commission to assess AMAX's property at 100% of its fair
market value.

Section 59-5-1 in pertinent part provides, "All

taxable property, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be
assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash value." Utah Code
Ann. S 59-5-1 (1986).
AMAX, presumably under the equal protection argument,
claims:
It is obvious that nothing except the
formal classification of the Plant and the
Ponds as "centrally assessed" supports the
nonapplicability of
U.C.A. S 59-5-4.5 to
AMAX. AMAX is denied the benefit of a 20%
deduction in calculating the "reasonable fair
cash value of its property simply because
that property is assessed by a state rather
than a county employee, and includes
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personal as well as real property. As a
result, AMAX has been
required "to shoulder
an unfair portion of the taxesH in violation
of the "requirement of uniformity".
Petitioner's Brief at 42, AMAX Magnesium Corporation v. Utah
State Tax Commission, No. 88-0251 (Utah 1988).

An initial

problem with AMAX's claim is that there are no distinctions made
between similarly situated property owners. AMAX, as a centrally
assessed property owner, is treated uniformly and equally with
all other centrally assessed property owners.

In essence, AMAX

wants preferential treatment which other state assessed taxpayers
do not and have never received.

It is unconstitutional to grant

preferential treatment to similarly situated property owners.
The Supreme Court of Utah in Rio Algom Corporation v.
San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984), stated that the
Constitution requires uniform assessment, however, the Supreme
Court recognized that there was not a single formula to assess
properties because of the nature of the properties being taxed.
The Supreme Court stated:
Under Article XIII, S 3, the property
taxes paid on each property are required to
have a uniform proportion to the value of the
property. Although the objective is easily
stated, its attainment is more difficult.
Because of the many different kinds of
property and the various factors that affect
their value, the determination of what
constitutes equal Hin proportion to the value
of his, her or its tangible property," under
Article XII, § 3, cannot be made by
application of any property single formula.
Of primary importance is the
determination of what valuation methods
should be utilized, and that depends on the
nature of the properties to be taxed.
Residential commercial, transportation,

mining, and public utilities, etc., must
be treated differently because of the
economic condititons that give value to such
properties•
Id. at 188.
AMAX, a a centrally assessed property, is complaining
that it is not treated as county-assessed property.

Were AMAX to

receive a 20% reduction, then there would be preferential
treatment of AMAX's property. The Tax Commission would have to
revise all of the centrally assessed poperty assessments to avoid
running afoul of the constitutional guarantees AMAX claims are
applicable.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Rio Algom
Corporation recognized that county assessed and centrally
assessed properties are not similarly situated properties because
different economic factors are operative upon them.

Moreover,

the Utah Supreme Court addresses the legislative intent to create
uniformity by enacting the statutes in question, i.e., S 59-5-3
and S 59-5-4.5. Because of those differences, AMAX's comparsion
between county-assessed and centrally assessed properties is
strained.

It is a comparison of incomparables, rather than

comparables.

The Tax Commisssion, even assuming AMAX's claim had

merit, does not have the authority to declare sections 59-5-4.5
unconstitutional because it does not give centrally assessed
property a 20% reduction; nor does the Tax Commission have the
consitutional authority to extend the coverage of section 59-54.5 to centrally assessed properites.
Further, assuming that the Utah Supreme Court could
declare section 59-5-4.5 unconstitutional (because it did not

give a 20% reduction to centrally assessed real property), AMAX
would not thereby be entitled to a 20% reduction.

It is a well

established rule of constituional law that the judiciary does not
supplant the legislature when passing upon the constitutional
validity of statutes.

The judiciary's prerogative is to declare

that a given statute is unconsitutional. The legislature must
then either rewrite the statute or let the declaration of
unconstitutionality stand.

As explained by the Wyoming Supreme

Court:
The assertion that Rule 71.1, supra, can be
interpreted to have directly repealed §§ 249-101, et seq., also seems to stray beyond
the bounds of this court's power to
supersede acts of the legislature. We are
empowered to make rules that are procedural
in nature. Sections 24-9-101 et seq.,
create a substantive and jurisdictional
right that our rule-making powers cannot
change. To do so would be to usurp a power
clearly vested in the legislature. This
court cannot legislate by repealing that
section.
McGuire v. McGuiref 608 P.2d 1278, 1290 (Wyo. 1980) (emhasis
added)•
In Rio Algom the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of section 59-5-4.5 against an equal protection
challenge brought by centrally assessed property owners who
claimed the statue was unconstitutional as applied to them.

As

framed by the Supreme Court, the arguement was that section 59-54.5 effects unconstitutional "discriminationw against centrally
assessed taxpayers, in violation of Article XIII sections 2 and 3
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of the Utah Constitution.

In answer to the defendant's claim,

the Rio Algom Court stated:
[A] certain degree of de facto
classification is unavoidable. Therefore,
notwithstanding the basic constitutional
objective of uniformity, there are many de
facto classifications that result from the
various valuation formulae utilized for
estimating market value.
Id. at 191. The Court continued to explain another reason for
dismissing the challenge against section 59-5-4.5, which was that
the legislature may meet the constituional requirements of
uniformity under Article XIII of the Utah Constitution in any
rational way it deems proper.

The legislature may find that the

local taxation scheme was discriminatory or in the words of the
Court "the Legislature may redress the imbalances and inequities
created." Id. at 193.
AMAX's arguments simply resurrect an argument the Utah
Supreme Court has already considred and dismissed.

AMAX attempts

to distinguish Rio Algom on the basis that AMAX comes before the
Court with a factual record, whereas, "Rio Algom was decided
without a factual record." Petitioner's Brief at 33-34, AMAX
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, No. 88-0251 (Utah
1988).

If this argument is accepted it would undermine the very

These provisions of the Utah Constitution as amended in
1983 are substantially the same as they were under the 1969
constitution in effect when Rio Algom was filed.
However, the
present Article XIII includes subsection 2(10) which provides
that "Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as
property or it may be taxed as property in such manner and to
such extent as the Legislature may provide . . . ." The
Legislature under the Utah Constitution in effect, when Amax
filed the present appeal had and has plenary power to tax or
exempt intangible property as it deemed appropriate.

rationale for the Rio Alqom decision, which is that the
legislature has plenary power in making such distinctions.

The

Legislature makes a distinction between centrally assessed and
county assessed properties.

The Supreme Court in Rio Algom

affirms the distinction as a constitutionally valid by stating:
Futhermore, the Legislature was justified
in enacting S 59-5-4.5 for another reason.
The Legislature acted on the premise that the
then-existing property tax scheme in the
state was discriminatory because it required
county-assessed taxpayers to shoulder an
unfair portion of the taxes and violated the
requirment of uniformity. The Legislature
was well aware, as the legislative history of
both challenged acts unequivocally
demonstrates, that there had been a large
shift of the property tax burden from stateassessed properties to county-assessed
properties as a result of inflation.

Certainly the Legislature may not
establish formal classifications of property
that result in nonuniform or disproportionate
tax burdens. But the Legislature may seek to
enforce the uniformity requirement of S 3 by
attempting to equalize the tax burden borne
by those taxpayers who pay a greater tax in
proportion to the value of their property
than others.
Id. at 193.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "Judicial

deference is usually accorded an agency's interpretation of a
statute which the agency is charged with enforcing."

Concerned

Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629 (Utah 1982).
The Court has further held that "Where the language of a statute
indicates a legislative intention to commit broad discretion to
an agency to effectuate the purposes of a legislative scheme,
this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as long as the agency's interpretation has warrant in the
-23-

record and a reasonable basis in the law." Hodges v. Western
Piling and Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986)at 720. The
Utah State Tax Commission has the responsibility of enforcing S
59-5-3.

The legislature granted the Commission broad discretion

in enforcing the tax laws of the State.

Through a process of

delegation the Property Tax Division has been assigned the task
of enforcing the State's tax laws. The Auditing Division has
enforced S 59-5-3 in accordance with its wording by assessing
AMAX's property.
AMAX is also wrong in suggesting that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution and similar
provisons of the state constitution preclude distinctions between
different classes of taxpayers.

The Utah Supreme Court in Rio

Algom embraced and reaffirmed the general rule that the
legislature, with respect to taxation statues, specifically
including property taxation, has wide latitude in making
distinctions.

Justice Stewart, writing for Rio Algom Court

stated:
Although we are concerned here with the
constitutionality of S 59-5-4.5 under Article
XII of the Utah Constitution, what has been
stated by the United States Supreme Court
with respect to tax statutes challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is relevant to the instant problem.
In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 2 (1973), the Court stated:
No scheme of taxation, whether the
tax is imposed on property, income,
or purchases of goods and services,
has yet been devised which is free of
all discriminatory impact. In such a
complex arena in which no perfect
alternatives exist, the Court does
well not to impose too rigorous a
* j

standard or scrutiny lest all local
fiscal schemes become subject of
criticism under the Equal Protecction
Clause.
Id. at 191 (emphasis added).

If AMAX prevailed in its Equal

Protection-type arguements, state and local fiscal schemes would
be totally disrupted.

Moreover, as the Rio Algom Court also

explained, the legislature has wide prerogative permitting a 20%
reduction for "transaction costs" in valuing county assessed
property, but denying the same reduction to centrally assessed
property. See id. at 193.

Since Rio Algom, the state

constitution has been amended to give the legislature plenary
power to tax or not tax intangibles, as it sees fit.
Furthermore, none of the cases AMAX cites in support of
the proposition that the equal protection clause of the federal
constituion mandates absolute uniformity and parity in taxation
statutes are applicable.

All the cases AMAX cites are cases

involving dicrimination against similarly situated taxpayers.
For example, Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620
(1946), which was cited by AMAX for the proposition that, "the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the
individual from state action that selects him out for
discriminatory treatement by sixbjecting him to taxes not imposed
on others of the same class." Petitioner's Brief at 43-44, AMAX
Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 88-0251
(Utah 1988).

Likewise, Maricopa County v. North Central

Development Co., 566 P.2d 688 (Ariz. App. 1977), involved

See footnote 9 on page 22.
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discrimination between various "construction projects . . . .M
Id. at 44. And Ernest W. Hahn# Inc. v. County Assessor/ 592 P.2d
965 (1975), involved discrimination between various properties
valued by the county. See Id.
The cases AMAX cites all involve discrimination between
similarly situated individuals. AMAX's constitutional analysis
is confused in the present case because county assessed property
and centrally assessed property are not in the same class or
grouping. See Rio Alqom Corporation/ 681 P.2d at 190.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion/ AMAX's arguments for claiming a 20%
reduction in valuation of its property are not justified under
the Utah Constituion, Utah Code Annotated, nor case law.
Likewise, the Commission's decision to assess AMAX's
property as "appurtenant" to a mine or mining claim should not be
overruled.

Section 59-5-3 therefore is the statute to apply to

AMAX's property that was correctly determined to be property
subject to central assessment.
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Appendix 1: AMAX Magnesium v. Property Tax Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission, No. 86-0203, at 4 (December
21, 1987).
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

AMAX MAGNESIUM,
Petitioner,

)

v.
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND FINAL DECISION
Appeal No.

86 0203

)
)

This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
(Tax Commission) for a Formal Hearing on June 4, 1987.

Blaine

Davis, and Joe Pacheco, Commissioners, heard the matter the Tax
Commission, and Mark K. Buchi represented the Petitioner.
Maxwell A. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, represented the
Respondent.
Originally the Property Tax Division valued Petitioner
for the 1986 tax year at $84,332,150.

That value was lowered

to $78,312,895 based upon a revision of the personal property
values.

At the informal hearing, the Tax Commission issued a

decision sustaining the division's taxable value of $78,312,895.
The Petitioner argued that further adjustments should
be made based upon economic and functional obsolescence.

In

addition, the Petitioner argues that the property should
bevalued by the local authorities, i.e., Tooele County instead

Appeal No. 86-r 73
of the Centrally Assessed Section of the Property Tax Division
and that the value should be reduced by 20%.
The Respondent argues that $78,312,895 is the
appropriate market value of the subject property as of the lien
date.

The Respondent further supports its assessment on the

grounds that it is appurtenant to a mine, i.e., the Great Salt
Lake, and therefore, is properly assessed by the Property Tax
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission instead of by the
local assessor of Tooele County and not eligible for the 20%
reduction in value for tax purposes.
The parties submitted evidence with regard to their
respective arguments.

Based upon the evidence submitted at the

hearing the Tax Commission makes these Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision.
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

The tax year in question is 1986.

2.

The lien date for the determination of market

value for the subject property is January l, 1986.
3.

The subject property was assessed by the Property

Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (59-2-201).
4.

The subject property consists of (a) a facility

for processing magnesium which consists of personal property,
improvements, and real property (the Plant) (b) a series of
evaporative ponds consisting of improvements and equipment
located on leased land owned by the state of Utah and various
federal agencies (the Ponds).
5.

Only four magnesium production plants exist in

the entire world.
6.

Magnesium is extracted through various chemical

and electrical processes from brine containing magnesium
chloride.
7.

Production from the facility depends on the

existence of a large supply of brine for processing.
8.

The ponds are a series of earth dikes with

improvements and equipment in which, through a seven year
process of evaporation, salt water is converted to brine.
9.

Since 1983, the ponds have not produced

sufficient brine to supply the needs of the plant.

Therefore,

the Petitioner has purchased a portion of the brine from
outside suppliers.
10.

The equipment used in the harvesting and

extraction process is subject to the corrosive nature of the
salt.

However, the equipment is made resistant by using

special metals and paints.

Therefore, the equipment does not

necessarily have a shorter life than normal mining equipment.
11.

Petitioner, by its processes, is obtaining metal

products from the brine and, therefore, is effectively "mining"
brine from the Great Salt Lake and then extracting the mineral
magnesium from the salt brine.
12.

The plant is located approximately 15 miles from

the Ponds and the brine is transported from the Ponds to the
Plant for processing.
13.

The dikes were raised and strengthened prior to

the lien date to preclude them from being breached by the
rising Great Salt Lake.

These expenditures for raising and

--
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strengthening are expenses and not capital improvements, and
should not to be added to the Plant value.
14.

The argument of the Petitioner that the breach of

the dike was a forseeable inevitability that should result in
economic obsolescence being given on the lien date is not
supported by competent

evidence.

The Tax Commission

acknowledges that post-lien date events that are forseeable may
affect value.

However, the issue of forseeability goes only to

the discount a willing buyer would ask because cf that
forseeable event taking place.

It does not mean that on the

lien date an assumption is made that the event has already
taken place and the value is reduced accordingly.

In this

particular case, the Petitioner has failed to present
sufficient evidence as to what this forseeability discount
might be.

Therefore, no reduction is granted.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Section 59-5-4.5 allows a 20% reduction in market

value to property which is locally assessed.

The language of

the section does not apply to property which is centrally
assessed such as the subject property.

Such non-application of

the exemption to the centrally assessed property is not
unconstitutional.
2.

Rio Algom v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184.

For 1986, the subject plant is appurtenant to the

mine, i.e., the Great Salt Lake, ponds from which the minerals
were extracted.

It is, therefore, subject to central

assessment under Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-3.

If the plant were

used exclusively to produce magnesium from brine purchased from
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outside suppliers it would not be appurtenant to the mine from
which the minerals were extracted, and it would be subject to
assessment by local authorities.
3.

The raising of the dike and the maintenance of

the dike is an expense and not a capital improvement.
Therefore, those costs are to be expensed and not added to the
value of the plant.
4.

Unpersuasive legal authority has been presented

to the Commission to support an argument for a reduction in
value due to the foreseeability of impacts from the rising lake
after the lien date.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings of facts and
conclusions of law, it is the Decision and Order of the Utah
State Tax Commission that the Respondent adjust its records to
reflect that the expense of dike maintenance should not be
included as a capital investment . The balance of the
assessment is affirmed.

DATED this JJ^

^

day of /yAJ^^yt£lStJ

, 1987.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

R.H. Hansen
Lirman
B. P&checo
Commissioner

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

NOTICE: it is hereby given that you have 30 days from the
date of mailing of this decision to appeal to the Tax Court
or the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
JEH/lgh/5240w
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Appendix 2: Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(10); Utah Const, art.
XIII, § 3(1); Utah Const, art. XIII, § 11.
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Art. XEI, § 2

ARTICLE XIII
REVENUE AND TAXATION

Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value ascertained — Exemption of state and municipal property — Exemption of tangible personal property
held for sale or processing — Exemption of property used for irrigating land — Exemption of
property used for electrical power — Remittance
or abatement of taxes of poor — Exemption of
residential and household property — Disabled
veterans' exemption — Intangible property —
Legislature to provide annual tax for state*]
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.
(2) The following are property tax exemptions:
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries;
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city,
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to
the ad valorem property tax;
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; and
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute. This
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by
statute.
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by lawfromsuch taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or otherwise originating within or without the state.
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., held for
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted.
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants,
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exemptedfromtaxation to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes.

Alt. X m , § 2

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for
generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which is used for
furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the
state of Utah, may be exemptedfromtaxation to the extent that such property
is used for such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may
prescribe.
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in
such manner as may be provided by law.
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemptionfromtaxation: of
not to exceed 45% of the fair market value of residential property as defined
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for
himself and family.
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the military service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were
killed in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the
Legislature may provide.
(10) Intangible property may be exemptedfromtaxation as property or it
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legislature may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also
be taxed. Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation.
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there
be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years
from the final passage of the law creating the debt.

coNsnnmoN OF UTAH
ARTICLE XIII
REVENUE AND TAXATION

Art. X m , § 3

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property —
Livestock — Land used for agricultural purposes.]
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money,
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature shall
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the
Legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock.
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes,
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the
value it may have for other purposes.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE XIII
REVENUE AND TAXATION
ART. XIII, § 11

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 11. [Creation of State Tax Commission—Membership—Governor to
appoint—Terms—Duties—County boards—Duties.]

There shall be a State Tax Commission consisting of four members, not
more than two of whom shall belong to the same political party. The members of the Commission shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the
consent of the Senate, for such terms of office as may be provided by law.
The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the tax laws of
the State. It shall assess mines and public utilities and adjust and equalize
the valuation and assessment of property among the several counties. It
shall have such other powers of original assessment as the Legislature may
provide. Under such regulations in such cases and within such limitations
as the Legislature may prescribe, it shall review proposed bond issues, revise the tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize the assessment
and valuation of property within the counties. The duties imposed upon
the State Board of Equalization by the Constitution and Laws of this
State shall be performed by the State Tax Commission.
In each couiity of this State there shall be a County Board of Equalization consisting of the Board of County Commissioners of said county. The
County Boards of Equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and
assessment of the real and personal property within their respective counties, subject to such regulation and control by the State Tax Commission
as may be prescribed by law. The State Tax Commission and the County
Boards of Equalization shall each have such other powers as may be prescribed by the Legislature. (As amended November 4, 1912, effective January 1, 1913; November 4, 1930, effective January 1, 1931; November 4,
1958, effective January 1,1959.)

Appendix 3: Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602(3) (1987); Utah Code
Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986); Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3
(1986); Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5(1)(1986);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(3)(ii) (1988).
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59-1-602. Appeal from tax commission to tax division of
district court — Waiver — Review by Supreme
Court [Effective until January 1, 1988].
(1) Within 30 days after notice of any decision by the commission rendered
after a formal hearing before it, any aggrieved party appearing before the
commission or county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision may
appeal or petition for review to the tax division of the district court located in
the county of residence or principal place of business of the affected taxpayer
or, in the case of a taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a statewide basis, to
the Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County.
(2) In all cases, whether or not proper under Subsection (1), any aggrieved
party appearing before the commission or county whose tax revenues are
affected by the decision may appeal or petition for review a decision rendered
after a formal hearing of the commission to the Tax Division of the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County within the specified 30
days following notice of such decision.
(3) In the alternative, a taxpayer may waive review and trial de novo in the
tax division of the district court and, within the specified 30 days following
the required notice, may seek review by the Utah Supreme Court upon writ of
certiorari. If a taxpayer or any affected county chooses to waive right of review by the tax division of the district court and applies for a writ in the
Supreme Court, the taxpayer or affected county shall (a) state in the application for the writ that the taxpayer or affected county is waiving the right of
review and trial de novo in the tax division of the district court, and (b)
comply with § 59-5-112 as though seeking review in the tax division of the
district court. A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being
reviewed shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before the
Supreme Court.

59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property — Residential
property — School district unmet need computations — County registration of aircraft [Effective until January 1,1988].
(1) (a) All taxable property, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be
assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash value. That value shall be
reported on the tax notice mailed to the property owner as provided in
§ 59-10-10.
(b) Adjustments, on forms prescribed by the tax commission under
Subsection 59-5-46(4), shall be made to the reasonable cash value to
reduce the value 25% on residential property for tax purposes. For
purposes of the adjustment, residential property means any property
used for residential purposes as a primary residence. Property used for
transient residential use and condominiums used in rental pools shall
not qualify for the residential exemption. No more than one acre of
land per residential unit shall qualify for the residential exemption.
Land and the improvements thereon shall be separately assessed.
School district unmet need computations for critical school building aid
shall be determined as though the bonding capacity had not been increased because of changes in the assessment rate.
(2) Aircraft required to be registered with the state through the county
in which the aircraft is located shall be taxed in accordance with the uniform tax established under § 59-5-1.5.

59-5-3. Assessment by State Tax Commission — Properties assessed by, enumerated [Effective until
January 1,1988].
W-5-3. Assessment by state tax commission—Properties assessed by,
ttmnerated.—Pipelines, power lines and plants, canals and irrigation
works, bridges and ferries, and the property of car and transportation
companies, when they are operated as a unit in more than one county; all
property of public utilities whether operated within one county or more;
all mines and mining claims, and the value of metalliferous mines based
on three times the annual net proceeds thereof as provided in section
59-5-57, and all other mines and mining claims and other valuable deposits,
including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons, nonmetalliferous minerals
underlying land the surface of which is owned by a person other than the
owner of such minerals, all machinery used in mining and all property or
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims and
the value of any surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or
mining property for other than mining purposes; must be assessed by the
state tax commission as hereinafter provided. All taxable property not
required by the Constitution or by law to be assessed by the state tax commission must be assessed by the county assessor of the several counties in
which the same is situated. For the purposes of taxation all mills, reduction
works and smelters used exclusively for the purpose of reducing or
smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof shall
be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or mining claim though the
same is not upon such mine or mining claim.

59*5-4.5. Recognition of expenses in using comparable
sales or cost appraisal method.
(1) When the county assesor uses the comparable sales or cost appraisal
method in valuing taxable property for assessment purposes, the assessor is
required to recognize that various fees, services, closing costs, and other
expenses related to the transaction lessen the actual amount that may be
received in the transaction. The county assessor shall, therefore, take 80%
of the value based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the property as
its reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment.
(2) (a) Prior to January 1,1988, the State Tax Commission shall develop
and implement comparable sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing
taxable property for assessment purposes which provide that the various fees, services, closing costs, and other expenses related to the sales
transaction and other intangible values are not included as part of the
reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment.
(b) Beginning January 1 1988, the provisions of Subsection (1) do
not apply to county assessors using the sales or cost appraisal method
in valuing taxable property for assessment purposes. For assessments
beginning January 1, 1988, the State Tax Commission shall by rule
order county assessors to use the comparable sales or cost appraisal
methods which are required to be developed and implemented in Subsection (2)(a) in place of the requirement of Subsection (1).

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until January 1, 1988].
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; *
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
cont...

Appendix 4: Illustrative Maps.
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